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Taylor v. Truckee Meadows Fire Prot. Dist., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 1 (Feb. 4, 2021)1 
 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION: SUFFICIENCY OF TEMPORARY, LIGHT-DUTY 




 When determining if an employer’s offer for temporary, light-duty employment is 
reasonable and meets the requirements set forth within NRS 616C.475(8), the Court should 
consider the proximity of the temporary employment to the individual’s residence as compared 
to the prior employment. When determining whether the temporary employment is substantially 
similar in hours the Court can look both the number hours of worked per week and the schedule. 
The reasonableness of an employer’s offer for temporary, light-duty employment is not 




 In April 2016, Appellant Vance Taylor severely injured his shoulder in a training exercise 
while working as a fire captain for respondent Truckee Meadows Fire Protection District 
(hereinafter “TMFPD”). After filing a workers’ compensation claim, Taylor received temporary 
total disability benefits from respondent Alternative Service Concepts, LLC (“ASC”). In the 
three-month period between his injury and shoulder surgery, Taylor accepted light-duty work at 
TMFPD’s administrative office in lieu of temporary total disability benefits. During this time, 
Taylor worked as a secretary Monday through Friday from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. and completed data 
entry and filing projects under the supervision of the office’s secretary. In July 2016, Taylor 
underwent shoulder surgery and began receiving temporary total disability benefits again.  
 
 In September 2016, Taylor’s doctors released him to light duty and TMFPD offered 
Taylor the same administrative position he had prior to surgery. Taylor refused this offer, 
claiming that it did not comply with Nevada law because it changed his work schedule and 
required him to perform “humiliating and unlawful” duties. Because TMFPD extended a 
temporary light duty employment, ASC terminated Taylor’s temporary total disability benefits.  
 
 Taylor administratively appealed ASC’s decision to terminate benefits, and the hearing 
officer upheld the decision to terminate benefits. Taylor appealed that decision, and the appeals 
officer affirmed the decision of the hearing officer. Taylor then petitioned the district court for 
judicial review, claiming that the denial of temporary total disability benefits was erroneous. The 




 NRS 616C.475(8) requires that the temporary, light-duty employment offered by the 
employer must (1) be substantially similar to the employee’s position at the time of his or her 
injury in relation to the location of the employment and the hours the employee is required to 
work; (2) provide a gross wage that is substantially similar to the gross wage the employee was 
 
1  By Greer Sullivan. 
earning at the time of the injury; and (3) have the same employment benefits as the position that 
the employee had at the time of injury.2  
 
 The Court found that the temporary, light-duty employment offered by TMFPD was 
substantially similar in location to Taylor’s preinjury position because (1) the new location was 
similar to Taylor’s preinjury work location in proximity and in distance from his residence, and 
(2) Taylor failed to demonstrate how the new location imposed an unreasonable burden. The 
Court additionally found that the temporary, light-duty employment offered by TMFPD was 
substantially similar in hours to Taylor’s preinjury position. The Court determined that the term 
“hours” was ambiguous because it was susceptible to more than one natural and honest 
interpretation. Using legislative history, the Court determined that “hours” encompassed both the 
actual number of hours worked and the schedule of work.  
 
The Court held that the temporary, light-duty employment offered by TMFPD was 
substantially similar in hours. Although the temporary, light-duty employment offered by 
TMFPD totaled to 40 hours a week, as opposed to the 48 hours in his preinjury employment, 
Taylor still the same rate of pay. The Court also determined it was substantially similar because 
both jobs required Taylor to work during the daytime hours for at least half of his shift. Beyond 
that, the Court concluded that common sense required a determination that the schedules are 
substantially similar: a determination that the administrative schedule is not substantially similar 
to the preinjury firefighter schedule would in effect preclude firefighters from ever receiving an 
offer for temporary, light-duty employment offered by TMFPD because non-firefighter 
employment does not often run on a firefighter schedule. Thus, some variation in schedule is 
necessary.  
 
 The Court additionally concluded that the temporary, light-duty employment offered by 
TMFPD was substantially similar in gross wage because the calculation included two holidays 
and 189 hours of overtime. The Court also held that the offer was reasonable even though some 
of the tasks were menial or otherwise in a different capacity than the preinjury job. Additionally, 
the Court held that the mere fact that an employee believes that a position is beneath them does 




 The Court found that because the temporary, light-duty employment offered by TMFPD 
was both reasonable and complied with the requirements set forth in NRS 616C.475(8), ASC 
was justified in terminating Taylor’s temporary total disability benefits. As such, the Court 
affirmed the district court’s decision to deny Taylor’s petition for judicial review.  
 
2  See NEV. REV. STAT.§ 616C.475(8) (2020). 
